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RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
ETHICAL VALUES OF CONFIDENTIALITY
AND SAVING A LIFE: A JEWISH VIEW
Arthur Gross Schaefer and Peter S. Levi*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The scenario, as presented in this Symposium, pits in mortal
combat the two ethical values of keeping a confidence and saving a
life. The scales of justice must carefully weigh the competing
considerations to determine which would tip the scale in favor of one
option. It is as if a judge listed the positives and negatives of keeping
a confidence versus saving a life and drew some utilitarian conclusion.
However, this approach is one of conflict resolution which presupposes two commensurate and competing sides which must have a
victor and a vanquished. The Jewish ethical tradition occupies a
different vantage point based upon a clear principle that spiritual
values will trump socially based rules.
While this Essay will include the manifestation of a number of
concepts, the goal is to look for an understanding of the hierarchical
ethical system embodied in the Jewish tradition. Generally speaking,
social laws receive less priority than laws embodying spiritual truths.
Jewish wisdom provides practical information and guidance for the
maintenance of society in addition to spiritual truths to guide
individuals toward a closer relationship with God. For example, social
laws are needed so that people do not harm each other and so that
property rights are protected. At the same time, legal structures
express essential spiritual values. Of course, ritual law and social law
are not mutually exclusive realms since social laws often contain
spiritual value.

* Arthur Gross Schaefer, J.D., C.P.A., Rabbi, is a Professor of Business Law at
Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, California. Peter S. Levi is a Ph.D candidate
in Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and is enrolled in the rabbinic
program at Hebrew Union College, Los Angeles, California.
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Accordingly, it is important to recognize the danger of the
overlapping nature of Jewish law and avoid the appeal to rigorous
legal structures at the expense of the spiritual aspects. This risk is
especially true when legal aspects are independent of spiritual aspects.
In the modem age where reason is sublime, ethical theory has moved
away from the spiritual realm to the exclusively rational. In this
rational sphere, society often neglects the spiritual aspects of law at
the expense of the social law-generally understood to be the proper
subject of consequential or duty-based reasoning. Society uses such
phrases as "it stands to reason" to explain the obvious need and
correctness of such laws. For instance, these rules may be based on
utilitarian considerations of procedures that will produce the greatest
good or least harm for the community. This often reduces ethical
decision making to a mere mechanical utilitarian analysis.
On the other hand, the spiritual aspects of guidelines have value
by their own virtue, irrespective of their social utility or inherent logic.
Generally, the legal structures developed for the maintenance of a
civilized society are merely concrete statements of spiritually based
laws mediated by a particular society in order to solidify spiritual
truths. However, rabbis were often worried that the dogma of the
legal rules may impede or even do violence to their spiritual
considerations. If such a conflict arose, it would be critical to
interpret the legal rules in order to leave the spiritual truths intact.
In short, the goal was often not mediating between conflicting values
but interpreting practical laws so that spiritual truths are followed.
Clearly, the rabbis' concerns were to narrowly view socially important
laws as consistent with spiritual truths. Accordingly, when a spiritual
value is at risk it is important to avoid the blind application of
legalism.'
The biblical story of Jephthah perhaps best illustrates this
dichotomy.
Jephthah made the following vow to Adonai: "If Thou wilt
indeed deliver the children of Ammon into my hand, then it
shall be, that whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my
house to meet me, when I return in peace from the children
of Ammon, it shall be the LORD'S and I will offer it up for
a burnt-offering."'

1. Judges 11:30-31, in THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFroRAHs 667 (Dr. J. H. Hertz ed.,
2d ed. 1960).
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Upon returning home, his only child greets him at the door, and
Jephthah mourns that he made the vow that he has no intention of
breaking.' For Jephthah, the vow taken to God will take precedence
over every other value in accordance with the law of Numbers:
"When a man voweth a vow unto the LORD, or sweareth an oath to
bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his 'word;
he shall do
3
according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.
One might believe that Jephthah would receive praise for his
willingness to keep a promise to God even when it involved the
sacrifice of his daughter. Nevertheless, the rabbis severely blame
Jephthah for not annulling a vow that ultimately caused the death of
an innocent person. Moreover, the tradition also heavily criticizes the
High Priest-the acknowledged legal authority of the time-for not
finding a legal way to circumvent the disastrous vow. The rabbinic
authorities over the past 2000 years saw laws as important constructs
to be manipulated in order to maintain the integrity of the more
important spiritual value of saving a life.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF SAVING A LIFE

Life is one of the highest values in the Jewish tradition, equated
with the worth of an entire world.4 This concept is clearly articulated
in the Mishnah-the first Jewish legal code codified around 200
C.E.-which provides:
For this reason was man created alone, to teach thee that
whosoever destroys a single soul of Israel, scripture imputes
[guilt] to him as though he had destroyed a complete world;
and whosoever preserves a single soul of Israel, scripture
ascribes [merit] to him as though he had preserved a
complete world.'
The value of each individual life extends well beyond the parameters
of that person's physical existence to all future generations to come.
This great value is expressed in the negative duty not to murder and
the positive one to save a life.
The Jewish tradition, in contrast to the American legal system,
confers both positive and negative duties upon individuals. The
2. Id.

3. Numbers 30:3, in THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS, supra note 1, at 702.
4. THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, 1 Sanhedrin 37a, Seder Nezikin 234 (Rabbi Dr. I.
Epstein ed. & Jacob Shachter & H. Freedman trans., 1935).
5. i.
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Talmud teaches that: ' ]othing ...stand[s] [as a more important
conflicting duty] before [the duty of] saving life, with the exception of
[the duties to refrain absolutely from] idolatry, incest and adultery,
and [premeditated] murder [which are absolutely prohibited even if
one must suffer death in order to avoid them]."6 Except for the
three negative duties mentioned, all obligations are pushed aside in
order to fulfill the commandment to save a life. The obligation to
save a life is therefore unique because it may supersede all other
commandments. This concept is called pikuach nefesh: saving a life.
Pikuach nefesh commands one to preserve a life and thus provide that
individual the opportunity to perform mitzvot-commandments-that
would otherwise be lost. Unlike our American legal system which
does not compel an affirmative action to save a life, biblical law
demands that one must act to save a life unless one's own life may be
put at risk. The imperative is found in the phrase, "[N]either shalt
thou stand idly by the blood of thy neighbour."7
Moreover, life is seen as a gift from God that is so highly prized
that suicide and active euthanasia are forbidden by Jewish law.' This
discussion points out the extremely fundamental value placed by
Jewish tradition on life and the saving of life. While confidentiality
is important, it clearly is not ranked as a fundamental spiritual value.
III.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY

There is no doubt that confidentiality is a highly respected Jewish
value. One is strictly forbidden to reveal a private conversation to
another without expressed permission from the original speaker.
And "[t]hou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy

6. THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Yoma 82a, Seder Mo'ed 404 (Rabbi Dr. I. Epstein
ed. & Leo Jung trans., 1938).
7. Leviticus 19:16, in THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS, supra note 1, at 501.
8. The limited exceptions regarding suicide can be generally categorized as a situation
involving an outside human being that would cause an individual to engage in activities
that desecrate the divine name. See THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gittin 47b, Seder Nashim
209-12 (Rabbi Dr. I. Epstein ed. & Jacob Shachter & H. Freedman trans., 1936); 1 Samuel
31:3-4, in SAMUEL I: A NEW ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT AND RASHI WITH A
COMMENTARY DIGEST 246-47 (Rabbi A. J. Rosenberg ed. & trans., 1976). For a helpful
discussion on the Jewish considerations when dealing with euthanasia, see BASIL F.
HERRING, JEWISH ETHICS AND HALAKHAH FOR OUR TIME: SOURCES AND COMMEN-

67-90 (1984).
9. THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Yoma 4b, Seder Mo'ed 13-17, supra note 6.
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people."'" An important consideration is the possibility of harm to
the individual whose confidentiality is breached.
Maimonides, one of our greatest rabbis, in his twelfth-century
codification of Jewish law," elaborates on the concept of the
talebearer from Leviticus 19:16: "Who is a tale-bearer? One who
carries reports and goes from one person to another and says, 'so-andso said this' or 'such-and-such have I heard about so-and-so.' Even
if he tells the truth, [the tale-bearer] destroys the world."'" The
implication is that it is wrong and harmful to tell falsehoods and
slander, but it is also wrong and harmful even if it is the truth. In
American law, the "truth" is an absolute defense against a charge of
defamation. As seen above, Jewish law generally prohibits repeating
even a truthful item. 3
The law goes further and forbids breaching another's confidentiality even if there is no harm. Based on the same verse in Leviticus
19:16, Rabbienu Gershom 4 ruled that mail carriers were prohibited
from reading other people's mail without permission. 5 Even if the
mail carriers told no one that they read the mail and kept the
information to themselves such that no harm could follow, it was still
forbidden. Israel Meir Hacohen, the Chofetz Chayim, writes:
If someone tells you a secret, you are obligated to conceal
it from others, since by repeating the secret information you
could cause damage to the person who confided in you. In
any event, even if no damage could possibly be caused, it is
wrong to go against the other person's wishes. 6
With respect to confidentiality, that certain information is the
truth or will not cause any harm to the individual does not provide a

10. Leviticus 19:16, in THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS, supra note 1, at 501.
11. Hilkhot De'ot ch. 7:2, in THE BOOK OF KNOWLEDGE: FROM THE MISHNAH
TORAH OF MAIMONIDES 14 (H.M. Russell & Rabbi J. Weinberg trans., 1981) [hereinafter
BOOK OF KNOWLEDGE].
12. Leviticus 19:16, in THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS, supra note 1, at 501.
13. The exception to the rule of keeping harmful information confidential is when the

party or a third party may be forming a partnership or may cause lbarm to a third party
ignorant of this information.
14. 965-1023 C.E.
15. 3 THE JEWISH LAW ANNUAL 128 (1980) (noting also that Gershom's edict is cited
in Be'er hagoleh, Yoreh De'ah 334:123). The prohibition against talebearing may be
"equally applicable whether the bearing of tales is directed to another person or to
oneself." Id. (citing 1 SEFER HALEKET, no. 173).
16. RABBI ZELIG PLISKIN, GUARD YOUR TONGUE ch. 8:5, at 163 (1975) (quoting
Israel.Meir Hacohen.
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reason to breach one's confidence. Confidentiality is an important

value but we need to understand whether it warrants the same
consideration as saving a life.'7
IV.

CONFIDENTIALITY AND SAVING A LIFE ARE
NOT CONFLICTING SPIRITUAL VALUES

The classification of saving a life as a fundamental principle of
Jewish law is not dependent upon a social rationale. In contrast,
confidentiality may be justified on grounds of social utility, namely
preventing harm to others. Certainly, such arguments can be and are

made in the secular world, but these are not necessary from the
Jewish perspective. Saving a life is an absolute spiritual value and
when a fundamental value is at stake, socially useful doctrines are
interpreted to sustain the fundamental principle. For example, the
rule of not eating on Yom Kippur-a socially useful doctrine-is put
aside when someone is significantly ill.
Strangely enough, the two values in question in our discussion-confidentiality and saving a life-are alluded to in the same
verse of Scripture, Leviticus 19:16: "Thou shalt not go up and down
as a talebearer among thy people; neither shalt thou stand idly by the
blood of thy neighbour: I am the LORD."' 8 The juxtaposition of the
two parts of this verse is not an accident. The latter half is brought
to bear on the former. The first part of the verse provides that
privacy and confidential information cannot generally be divulged.

17. With respect to the case under consideration, Jewish tradition does not include a
sacramental, confessional tradition. This does not imply that confession has no role in a
Jew's life. Confession, forgiveness, and changing one's behavior are considered essential
parts of one's repentance. Despite our transgressions, we have the ability to change and
become better people, and confession is a part of this process. Yet, this confession is often
between the transgressor and the individual violated and between the transgressor and
God. And like God, we are expected to be slow to anger and quick to forgive. But
repentance is not complete until there is behavioral change. As such, confession need not
be made to a rabbi. Jews do not confess to other human beings in the hopes of receiving
absolution from them. As a result, the confidence between a rabbi and congregant is not
any more privileged than the confidence between any two individuals. Yet, as leaders in
a religious community, rabbis may be privileged by their congregants. Thus, many rabbis,
when asked to keep a communication confidential, may reply that "if you trust me with
important information, you must trust that I will act appropriately with the information."
In fact, this view was posited by many of Dr. Gross Schaefer's rabinnical colleagues at the
Union of American Hebrew Congregations National Convention in Atlanta, Ga. (Nov. 30,
1995). This statement clearly indicates to the other party the rabbi's unwillingness to be
bound prior to knowing the extent and nature of the information.
18. Leviticus 19:16, in THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFrORAHS, supra note 1, at 501.
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This prohibition is limited and modified by the latter phrase which is
traditionally interpreted to mean that one should do everything
possible to protect life and property from loss and injury, directly or
indirectly, including providing information. For example, "if thy
fellowman is accused of a crime, and evidence that would clear him
of it is in thy possession, thou are not at liberty to keep silent."' 9 If
revealing confidential information will result in preventing harm or
protecting life, action must be taken immediately to avoid such harm
or loss of life. Hence, saving a life takes precedence over preserving
a confidential communication. The absolute spiritual value of life
ranks higher in the hierarchy, thus precluding any possible need for
a calculation weighing disparate values.
The spiritual value of life is incommensurate with all other values
and thus supersedes them, except for the three cases mentioned in the
first section. Yet, there is a human tendency to neglect spiritual value
for practical or social value. This may result from comfort with the
precision of legal details of the law or from emphasis on the rational
at the expense of the spiritual. When social values conflict, a
utilitarian calculation can settle the problem. Under Jewish tradition,
however, decisions are not made using a utilitarian calculation in cases
where the fundamental spiritual value of life is at stake. If a city is
besieged by an enemy, and the enemy demands that the city's
inhabitants sacrifice one person so that the rest will be let free, they
are forbidden to give up an innocent life, even if it would save the
entire community.' If only considering the utility values, the case
would be decided differently. In light of the fundamental spiritual
value of life, however, no utilitarian calculation is permitted.
While there is a positive commandment to save a life, the
responsibility is limited when the rescuer's life may be put in danger.
Accordingly, a person is not required to save a life if there is a threat
to personal safety. When pirates would kidnap innocent people for
ransom, the rabbis, in order to protect the community, ruled that
excessive ransoms were not to be paid.21 Otherwise, this would
inform the pirates that the Jewish community would pay the
exorbitant amount and consequently, Jews would be at greater risk of

19. THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFrORAHS, supra note 1, at 501 (citing the Sifra).
20. See Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah ch. 5:5, in THE BOOK OF KNOWLEDGE:, supra note
11, at 219 (based on Talmud Yerushalmi, Terumot, ch. 8).
21. THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gittin 45a, Seder Nezikin 195-96 (Rabbi Dr. I.
Epstein ed. & Maurice Simon trans., 1936).
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kidnapping. While there may be a utility-maximizing justification for
this outcome, in that a few individual Jews might suffer in order to
protect the community, the reasoning is not based on a utilitarian
calculation. Thus, the community is not required to redeem the
captive if it will endanger itself in the process.
In terms of the case considered in this Symposium, an argument
for weighing the benefit of keeping confidentiality against the harm
of the innocent victim's death cannot even be made from the Jewish
perspective. Such an argument completely neglects the absolute value
of saving a life, a value that always supersedes an oath such as an
oath of confidentiality. While the case of Jephthah is decisive, in that
saving a life supersedes any oath, this general rule is emphasized
when applied to the specific situation of an oath to keep a professional confidence.
Rabbi Joseph Colon was once asked for a legal opinion concerning how Jewish law would deal with persons who have information
concerning the whereabouts of lost property but who do not want to
reveal information received as a matter of professional confidence.'
Jewish law, which provides that lost property be returned to its
rightful owner, also places value on not divulging information told in
confidence. However, Colon's opinion not only requires the
individual to give the information in order to affect the return of lost
property; it also states that professionals who do not disclose the
secret because it would betray a confidence should be dealt with more
severely than a wanton perpetrator. These professionals are
deceivers, perverting the letter of Jewish law to circumvent its spirit,
namely, the return of lost property. One cannot take a particular
oath-like an oath not to breach a confidence-that nullifies a divine
commandment. The Mishnah declares that an oath not to testify in
a given matter is an oath taken in vain.' A Jew is bound by a prior
oath from the time of the revelation at Mount Sinai to fulfill the
divine commandments. Therefore, the commandment to return lost
property supersedes the keeping of a professional confidence.
Confidentiality is not an absolute value like the spiritual value of
fulfilling a divine commandment and so it must yield to the commandment.

22. Rabbi Joseph Colon, Responsa110, in JEWISH LAW AND JEWISH LIFE: SELECTED
RABINNICAL RESPONSA 29 (Stephen M. Passamaneck ed. & trans., 1977).
23. THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shevuot 29a, Seder Nezikin 158 (Rabbi Dr. I. Epstein
ed. & Jacob Shachter & H. Freedman trans., 1935).
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WHAT DOES THE RABBI Do IN THE SCENARIO
OF THE SYMPOSIUM?

It is clear that under Jewish law, confidentiality must be breached
when it comes up against an obligation to save a life. While the
absolute spiritual value of life is sufficient for the rabbi to make this
decision, it does not exhaust all the other considerations in this case.
For example, if the rabbi keeps silent concerning someone's transgression when harm will follow, that silence is considered as complicity:
"And if any one soul sins, in that he heareth the voice of adjuration,
he being a witness, whether he hath seen or known, if he do not utter
it, then he shall bear his iniquity."' 4 If the rabbi keeps silent, the
rabbi effectively becomes an accomplice to the sin by committing the
sin of aiding sinners-masayeh yedey ovrey avera-or in modem
terminology, compounding a felony.' And, as previously demonstrated, the rabbi would be considered more blameworthy than the
one who confided in the rabbi since the rabbi deliberately perverted
the Torah's command to save a life.
It may seem odd to ascribe sin to the unsuspecting rabbi who had
no intention of participating in the confessor's sin. Once the rabbi
has information, the rabbi is, however unwillingly, a participant in the
affair. At least the rabbi is bound to convince the confessor to tell
the truth. If the confessor refuses, then it is a sin for the rabbi to
keep silent and refrain from telling the truth to the proper authorities.? The Torah teaches us: "Thou shalt not ... put a stumbling
block before the blind."'2 7 This is interpreted to mean that an
individual may not give misleading advice, cause someone to commit

24. Leviticus 5:1, in THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFrORAHS, supra note 1, at 420.
25. Rabbi Isaac bar Sheshet Perfect offers the following teaching from the Talmud:
"On what Scriptural foundation do we base the obligation of a student, who is

seated before his master, to speak up if he sees some argument for a poor man
against a rich man, who are adversaries in a civil case?" The master, of course,
has not thought of the argument or has ruled for the rich man.
Rabbi Isaac bar Sheshet Perfect, Responsa 234, in 1 JEWISH LAW AND JEWISH LIFE:
SELECTED RABINNICAL RESPONSA 42 (Stephen M. Passamaneck ed. & trans., 1977)
(quoting THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shevuot 31a, Seder Nezikin 171 (Rabbi Dr. I.
Epstein ed. & A.E. Silverstone trans., 1938)). "The Scripture asserts keep thee far from
a false matter." Id. (quoting THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Exodus 23:7 (Rabbi Dr. I.
Epstein ed. & A.E. Silverstone trans., 1938)). "If silence is tantamount to a lie in a civil
matter, how much the more it is so in a criminal matter." Id.
26. SHuLcHAN ARucH, Chosen Mishpot 28:1.
27. Leviticus 19:14, in THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS, supra note 1, at 500.
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a sin, or place another in a position to suffer personal or financial
loss.' Accordingly, the rabbi incurs two further obligations: (1) to
prevent the state from sinning by killing an innocent person, and (2)
to prevent others from being hurt now or in the future. By not telling
the truth, the rabbi allows the state to act without all of the known
information and to ultimately commit the grievous sin of executing an
innocent person. Furthermore, by the rabbi's silence, a murderer is
allowed to live, freely function, and potentially cause harm to others.
VI.

CONCLUSION

One is certainly not permitted to keep a vow which leads to the
death of an innocent victim. According to Jewish tradition the
maintenance of civilized society requires that oaths to keep certain
information confidential be superseded when revealing such information can prevent harm to self or others. To keep promises for their
own sake is to neglect and violate the spiritual value of Jewish law.
The letter of the law does not serve itself; it serves the spiritual value
imbedded within it. An oath to keep strict confidentiality is an oath
taken in vain since an individual is first required to fulfill the higher
value of saving a life. For example, we teach our teenagers that
secrets cannot be kept when they might entail harm. Specifically, if
one is told in confidence by a friend that the friend is considering
suicide, one is obligated to tell somebody and get the friend help.
Accordingly, the value of saving a life supersedes the keeping of a
confidence.

28. Maimonides, 9 MISHNEH TORAH, The Book of Torts, ch. 1.13, 12.4 (Julian
Oberman ed. & Hymen Klein trans., 1954).

